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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.   
Luis Fernando Grijalva Martinez petitions for review of 
an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 
(1) holding that Grijalva Martinez was removable as an alien 
convicted of both an aggravated felony and a crime involving 
moral turpitude (“CIMT”), and (2) finding him ineligible for 
withholding of removal and protection under the Convention 
Against Torture (“CAT”).  Because Grijalva Martinez’s state 
conviction for criminal sexual contact constitutes both a CIMT 
and an aggravated felony, and because he is not entitled to 
withholding of removal or CAT relief, we will deny the 





Grijalva Martinez is a citizen of Guatemala.  In 
November 2013, his status was adjusted from asylee to lawful 
permanent resident.  In May 2016, he was convicted in the New 
Jersey Superior Court of criminal sexual contact, in violation 
of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-3(b), and of endangering the welfare 
of children, in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4(a)(1).  The 
Government subsequently commenced removal proceedings 
against Grijalva Martinez, alleging that he was removable as 
an alien convicted of a CIMT, an aggravated felony, and a 
crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment.  In 
proceedings before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), Grijalva 
Martinez denied that the conviction rendered him removable, 
and applied for withholding of removal and CAT protection.  
With respect to his applications for relief, Grijalva Martinez 
asserted that he feared violence at the hands of gang members, 
including his former stepfather.   
 
The IJ sustained the removability charges, finding that 
Grijalva Martinez’s conviction for criminal sexual contact was 
both a CIMT under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) and an 
aggravated felony, namely, sexual abuse of a minor, under 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  The IJ also found that Grijalva Martinez 
was ineligible for withholding of removal because he was 
convicted for criminal sexual contact, a particularly serious 
crime under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) and that Grijalva 
Martinez was ineligible for CAT relief because he had not 
established that he would be subject to torture if removed to 
Guatemala.   
 
Grijalva Martinez appealed to the BIA, which dismissed 
the appeal.  The BIA held that Grijalva Martinez was 
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removable because he had been convicted of both a CIMT and 
an aggravated felony.1  The BIA also adopted the IJ’s findings 
and conclusions denying Grijalva Martinez’s requests for 
withholding of removal and CAT relief.   
 
Grijalva Martinez petitions for review, arguing that the 
IJ and BIA (1) erred in concluding that criminal sexual contact 
is an aggravated felony, (2) erred in concluding that his 
conviction is for a particularly serious crime, and (3) failed to 




1 Because the BIA found that Grijalva Martinez’s 
conviction constituted both a CIMT and an aggravated felony, 
it determined that it did not need to address the IJ’s conclusion 
that Grijalva Martinez was also removable for having been 
convicted of a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child 
abandonment under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).   
2 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.1(b)(3).  Though we lack jurisdiction to review orders 
that remove aliens convicted of certain CIMTs, aggravated 
felonies, and certain other crimes, see 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(C); Francisco-Lopez v. Att’y Gen., 959 F.3d 108, 
112 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020); Restrepo v. Att’y Gen., 617 F.3d 787, 
790 (3d Cir. 2010), we retain jurisdiction to review 
“constitutional claims or questions of law,” § 1252(a)(2)(D), 
and “we have jurisdiction to determine our jurisdiction under 
§ 1252(a)(2)(C),” Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 
2001), meaning that we have jurisdiction to address the 
“jurisdictional prerequisite” of whether an alien’s prior 
convictions constitute CIMTs, aggravated felonies, or other 
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Grijalva Martinez does not challenge the BIA’s ruling 
that his conviction for criminal sexual contact constitutes a 
CIMT, a finding that provides a ground for removal.3  He does, 
 
criminal offenses that trigger § 1252(a)(2)(C)’s jurisdictional 
bar, Restrepo, 617 F.3d at 790.   
3 Grijalva Martinez’s decision not to challenge one of 
the two grounds upon which he was found removable leaves 
intact a ground for his removal.  In such a case, we may forgo 
review of the challenged ground if review would be “futile.”  
Ricketts v. Att’y Gen., 955 F.3d 348, 351 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing 
N.L.R.B. v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766 n.6 
(1969)); see also, e.g., Genego v. Barr, 922 F.3d 499, 502 (2d 
Cir. 2019) (holding that review may be “unnecessary if it 
would be pointless or futile, such as where there is an 
alternative and sufficient basis for the result” (citations 
omitted)).  Put differently, we can decline to review Grijalva 
Martinez’s challenge to the agency’s aggravated-felony 
determination if any error therein is “harmless” and would “not 
affect the outcome of [his] case.”  Guadalupe v. Att’y Gen., 
951 F.3d 161, 166-67 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Li Hua Yuan v. 
Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 2011)).   
However, the BIA’s classification of Grijalva Martinez 
as an aggravated felon precludes him from applying for certain 
relief from removal.  In particular, under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(a)(3), Grijalva Martinez is eligible to apply for 
cancellation of removal only if he “has not been convicted of 
any aggravated felony.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3); see also 
Randhawa v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1148, 1151 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that an alien’s CIMT convictions did not 
“automatically render harmless any error in the BIA’s 
discussion of the aggravated felony issue” because aggravated 
felons are not eligible to apply for cancellation of removal, 
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however, dispute that the conviction constitutes an aggravated 
felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).   
 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) defines 
the term “aggravated felony” to include “sexual abuse of a 
minor.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A); see also Restrepo v. Att’y 
Gen., 617 F.3d 787, 791 (3d Cir. 2010).  To determine whether 
Grijalva Martinez’s conviction for criminal sexual contact 
under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-3(b) constitutes sexual abuse of 
a minor, “we employ the ‘categorical approach’ of Taylor v. 
United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).”  Restrepo, 617 F.3d at 
791 (citing Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 34, 37 (2009)); 
see also Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1567-
68 (2017).  Here, “[t]he categorical approach requires a two 
step analysis:  first, we must ascertain the definition for sexual 
abuse of a minor, and second, we must compare this ‘federal’ 
definition to the state statutory offense in question.”  Restrepo, 
617 F.3d at 791 (citing Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 153 
(3d Cir. 2004)).  The statutory offense is defined by its 
elements.  “If [the type of] conduct that meets the federal 
definition of sexual abuse of a minor” would meet the elements 
for a conviction for criminal sexual contact under New Jersey 
law, then Grijalva Martinez’s conviction “qualifies as a 
conviction for sexual abuse of a minor and, by extension, an 
 
whereas some CIMT offenders are).  Moreover, the aggravated 
felony designation impacts Grijalva Martinez’s eligibility to 
seek a waiver of inadmissibility.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(9)(A)(i)-(ii).  Because an aggravated felony 
designation imposes collateral consequences that a CIMT does 
not, we will review the aggravated felony determination in this 
case.    
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aggravated felony for which [Grijalva Martinez] is 




Two of our precedents inform the first step of this 
analysis.  First, in Restrepo, we deferred to the BIA’s definition 
of the term “sexual abuse of a minor” in the INA, holding that 
the term is “most appropriately defined by” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3509(a)(8), which defines “sexual abuse” as including “the 
employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or 
coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to 
engage in, sexually explicit conduct or the rape, molestation, 
prostitution, or other form of sexual exploitation of children, or 
incest with children.”  Restrepo, 617 F.3d at 796 (quoting 
18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8)).  We noted that the BIA viewed 
§ 3509(a)(8) not “as a restrictive or limiting definition,” but 
rather “as a guide in identifying the types of crimes we would 
consider to be sexual abuse of a minor.”  Id. at 796 n.10 
(quoting Matter of Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991, 
996 (B.I.A. 1999)).   
 
Second, in Cabeda v. Attorney General, 971 F.3d 165 
(3d Cir. 2020), we reaffirmed that § 3509(a)(8) is the 
touchstone of the federal generic definition of “sexual abuse of 
a minor” under the INA, but we also noted that § 3509(a)(8) 
“does not specify a mens rea requirement.”  Id. at 173.  Because 
we could not “defer to a nullity,” we “look[ed] elsewhere to 
discern the mens rea required to establish the generic federal 
crime.”  Id.  Specifically, we looked to “the structure of the 
INA, the inherent egregious nature of an aggravated felony, 
and,” perhaps most importantly, a “closely-related statute[],” 
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18 U.S.C. § 2243.  Id. (quoting Acevedo v. Barr, 943 F.3d 619, 
624 (2d Cir. 2019)). 
 
Section 2243, a federal criminal statute entitled “sexual 
abuse of a minor or ward,” requires “knowing conduct as to the 
sexual act in question” but “establishes that no knowledge at 
all is required with respect to the victim’s age.”  Id. (citing 18 
U.S.C. § 2243); see also Acevedo, 943 F.3d at 624 (“[C]ourts 
have uniformly interpreted [Section 2243 and another similar 
federal statute] as disclaiming mens rea requirements with 
respect to the victim’s age.” (second alteration in original) 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 702 
F.3d 22, 33 (2d Cir. 2012))).  In Cabeda, we imported § 2243’s 
scienter standard for the actus reus, the sexual act, into the 
federal generic offense of sexual abuse of a minor, holding that 
the federal generic offense requires knowing conduct as to the 
sexual act, 971 F.3d at 173-74.  We had no need, however, to 
address whether § 2243’s proviso that the Government need 
not prove that the perpetrator knew the victim’s age applies to 
the federal generic offense.  Id.   
 
Today, we conclude that the federal generic offense 
includes both components of § 2243.  Section 2243 
criminalizes sexual contact with minors.  Thus, it complements 
§ 3509’s protection of minors who were victims of a sexual 
contact.  Like similar state statutes concerning sexual contact 
with minors, see, e.g., infra n.9, § 2243 does not require proof 
that the defendant knew the victim’s age.  See 18 U.S.C. § 
2243(d)(1).  Moreover, to impose a requirement that the 
perpetrator know the victim’s age would exclude from the 
federal generic offense a swath of sexual conduct unlawful 
under many state laws.  See Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 
1571 (holding that courts may “look to state criminal codes for 
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additional evidence about the generic meaning of sexual abuse 
of a minor”); Acevedo, 943 F.3d at 626 (same); Catherine L. 
Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public 
Welfare Offense Model, 53 Am. U. L. Rev. 313, 343-44 (2003) 
(surveying jurisdictions and noting that a majority of states, 
“substitute[] strict liability for a requirement of mens rea” in 
their statutory rape laws).  Thus, we join our sister circuits and 
hold that the federal generic offense of sexual abuse of a minor 
under the INA contains no scienter requirement as to the 
victim’s age.4  See, e.g., Bedolla-Zarate v. Sessions, 892 F.3d 
1137, 1141 (10th Cir. 2018); Contreras v. Holder, 754 F.3d 
286, 295 (5th Cir. 2014).   
 
As a result, the federal generic offense of sexual abuse 
of a minor requires proof that the defendant (1) knowingly 
engaged in an act that constitutes criminal sexual contact; and 
(2) engaged in such an act with a person who is of the age the 
statute covers, without the need for the government to prove 
that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known the 
person’s age. 
 
4 Because we focus on the elements of the crime when 
applying the categorical approach, see Restrepo, 617 F.3d at 
791, the fact that § 2243 contains an affirmative defense 
concerning the defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s age, see 
18 U.S.C. § 2243(c)(1), is of no consequence.  The statute is 
clear that proof of the victim’s age is not an element of the 
crime, see § 2243(d)(1) (providing that “the Government need 
not prove that the defendant knew . . . the age of the other 
person engaging in the sexual act”).  Cf. Smith v. United States, 
568 U.S. 106, 110 (2013) (distinguishing between elements 





Having identified the elements of the federal generic 
definition for sexual abuse of a minor, we next examine the 
elements of criminal sexual contact under N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:14-3(b) to determine whether the offenses categorically 
match.  Section 2C:14-3(b) provides that a defendant is guilty 
“if he commits an act of sexual contact with the victim under 
any of the circumstances set forth in section 2C:14-2c. (1) 
through (5).”  Section 2C:14-2(c)(1)-(5), in turn, sets forth a 
series of “alternatively phrased” factual scenarios.5  We must 
 
5 The scenarios set forth in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-2(c) 
are:   
(1) The actor commits the act using coercion or 
without the victim’s affirmative and freely-given 
permission, but the victim does not sustain 
severe personal injury; 
(2) The victim is on probation or parole, or is 
detained in a hospital, prison or other institution 
and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary 
power over the victim by virtue of the actor’s 
legal, professional or occupational status; 
(3) The victim is at least 16 but less than 18 years 
old and: 
(a) The actor is related to the victim by 
blood or affinity to the third degree; or 
(b) The actor has supervisory or 
disciplinary power of any nature or in any 
capacity over the victim; or 
(c) The actor is a resource family parent, 
a guardian, or stands in loco parentis 
within the household; 
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accordingly decide whether these alternatively listed items are 
“elements” of the offense or “means” to commit it.  Mathis v. 
United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2256 (2016).  Our review of the 
statute reveals that each subsection requires proof of a fact not 
required by another subsection.  As a result, each subsection 
contains a separate element that must be proven to secure a 
conviction.  New Jersey’s model jury instructions confirm this 
conclusion.  The instructions list the four subsections in 
Grijalva Martinez’s statute of conviction in the alternative, thus 
reflecting that each is an element.  NJ J.I. CRIM 2C:14-3b.  
Furthermore, jurors must be unanimous as to whether the 
government has proven each element of the offense.  NJ J.I. 
CRIM Non 2C Charges.  The need for jury unanimity also 
shows that the subsections embody elements of, not a means to 
commit, the offense.  See Hillocks v. Att’y Gen., 934 F.3d 332, 
339 (3d Cir. 2019) (concluding that elements are those “that 
 
(4) The victim is at least 13 but less than 16 years 
old and the actor is at least four years older than 
the victim; 
(5) The victim is a pupil at least 18 but less than 
22 years old and has not received a high school 
diploma and the actor is a teaching staff member 
or substitute teacher, school bus driver, other 
school employee, contracted service provider, or 
volunteer and the actor has supervisory or 
disciplinary power of any nature or in any 
capacity over the victim. As used in this 
paragraph, “teaching staff member” has the 
meaning set forth in N.J.S.18A:1-1. 
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need to be found unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt” by 
a trial jury).     
 
When a crime has multiple alternate elements, we apply 
a “modified categorical approach,” under which we may 
examine “a limited set of documents to see which of the 
alternatives served as the basis for the individual’s conviction.”  
Id. at 338 (citing Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 
269-70 (2013); Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249).  Among the 
documents we may consider in making this assessment is the 
charging instrument, although in looking at this instrument, we 
remain focused on the elements, not the facts, of the crime.  See 
United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 185, 189-90 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Descamps, 570 U.S. at 263), as amended (Nov. 4, 
2014).  Grijalva Martinez’s indictment alleged that he 
committed criminal sexual contact against a victim who was at 
least 13 but less than 16 years old while he was at least four 
years older than her, allegations that align with the offense set 
forth at N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-2(c)(4).6     
 
We will therefore compare the elements of the offense 
set forth at N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:14-3(b) and 2C:14-2(c)(4) 
with those of the federal generic offense.  N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 2C:14-3(b) and 2C:14-2(c)(4) criminalize engaging in 
“sexual contact” with a victim, § 2C:14-3(b), when “[t]he 
victim is at least 13 but less than 16 years old and the 
[defendant] is at least four years older than the victim,” 
§ 2C:14-2(c)(4).  This offense has two components:  a knowing 
act and the ages of the victim and defendant.  The act is “sexual 
 
6 The BIA also found that § 2C:14-2(c)(4) was the basis 
for Grijalva Martinez’s conviction, and he does not challenge 
this conclusion in his petition for review.   
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contact.”  Sexual contact is defined under New Jersey law as 
“an intentional touching by the victim or actor, either directly 
or through clothing, of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts for 
the purpose of degrading or humiliating the victim or sexually 
arousing or sexually gratifying the actor,” which is performed 
“in view of the victim whom the actor knows to be present.”  
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-1(d).  Section 3509(a) “defines 
‘sexually explicit conduct’ to include ‘sexual contact[,]’ which 
refers to ‘the intentional touching, either directly or through 
clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or 
buttocks of any person with an intent to abuse, humiliate, 
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify sexual desire of any 
person.’”  Restrepo, 617 F.3d at 800 (alteration in original).  As 
we observed in Restrepo, the “breadth of conduct encompassed 
by these provisions” makes “plain that”7 the conduct described 
in New Jersey’s definition of the term “sexual contact” also 
captures the conduct the federal generic offense prohibits.8  Id.   
 
7 In Restrepo, we rejected an attempt to define the 
federal generic definition of “sexual contact” more narrowly, 
given that a narrower definition would improperly exclude 
numerous state definitions of sexual contact, including that of 
New Jersey.  617 F.3d at 795 & n.7; see also Esquivel-
Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1571 (holding that courts may “look to 
state criminal codes for additional evidence about the generic 
meaning of sexual abuse of a minor”).   
8 The petitioner in Restrepo was convicted of 
aggravated criminal sexual contact in violation of N.J. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 2C:14-3(a) and 2C:14-2(a)(2)(a), an offense that 
criminalizes engaging in “sexual contact” with a victim, § 
2C:14-3(a), when “[t]he victim is at least 13 but less than 16 
years old,” § 2C:14-2(a)(2), and the defendant “is related to the 
victim by blood or affinity to the third degree,” § 2C:14-
14 
 
Turning to the age component, both the federal generic 
offense and the New Jersey statute make it a crime to engage 
in the prohibited acts with individuals who are at least 13 but 
less than 16.  See Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1568 
(“[T]he generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor 
requires that the victim be younger than 16.”); N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:14-2(c)(4) (covering criminal sexual contact with a 
victim who is least 13 but less than 16, and four years younger 
than the defendant).  Neither the federal generic offense nor the 
New Jersey law requires the government to prove that the 
defendant knew the age of the victim.  Rather, a defendant can 
be convicted of criminal sexual contact even if he did not 
know, and even if he could not reasonably have known, that 
the victim was underage.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2243(d) (providing 
that in a prosecution for sexual abuse of a minor, “the 
Government need not prove that the defendant knew . . . the 
age of the other person engaging in the sexual act”); N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:14-5(c) (“It shall be no defense to a prosecution for 
a crime under this chapter that the actor believed the victim to 
be above the age stated for the offense, even if such a mistaken 
 
2(a)(2)(a).  See 617 F.3d at 789, 800.  Applying the modified 
categorical approach, we held that this crime was a match for 
sexual abuse of a minor under the INA.  Id. at 800.  The only 
difference between the elements of Grijalva Martinez’s 
conviction and those of the conviction of the petitioner in 
Restrepo is the age of the defendant and the relation that he 
bears to the victim.  Compare N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-
2(a)(2)(a), with N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-2(c)(4).  For the 
purposes of applying the categorical approach and examining 
the conduct captured by the act of criminal sexual contact, the 
statutes here and in Restrepo are not materially different.   
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belief was reasonable.”).9  Thus, because a knowing criminal 
sexual act involving a victim of a particular age, whose age 
may not be known to the perpetrator, is an element of both the 
federal generic offense and the New Jersey criminal sexual 
contact offense, the two are a categorical match.  Because a 
crime that fits under the federal generic offense of sexual abuse 
of a minor is an aggravated felony, and because Grijalva 
Martinez’s crime of conviction matches the definition of the 
federal generic offense, the BIA correctly concluded that 
Grijalva Martinez’s conviction constitutes an aggravated 
felony that renders him removable.  
 
9 See also State v. Perez, 832 A.2d 303, 312 (N.J. 2003) 
(noting that the “standard in respect of a victim’s age” under 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14 is “only objective proof that the alleged 
victim was a child under the age of [consent], not that the 
accused knew or reasonably should have known that fact”); 
State v. Saponaro, No. A-0741-15T3, 2017 WL 2348869, at *2 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 31, 2017) (“We have long held 
that a mistaken belief as to the age of a victim in an age-based 
sexual crime is not a defense. . . . ‘The crime has been defined 
by the Legislature in terms which negate any element of 
criminal intent on the part of the actor.’ . . . Our Legislature 
recognized that children should be protected—without regard 
to a perpetrator’s knowledge of the minor’s age—from sexual 
assaults. . . .” (quoting State v. Moore, 253 A.2d 579, 581 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969))); NJ J.I. CRIM §§ 2C:14-3b, 





Grijalva Martinez contends that he is entitled to 
withholding of removal because he was not convicted of a 
particularly serious crime.  Under the INA, “the Attorney 
General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney 
General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be 
threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).  However, 
“withholding of removal is unavailable if [an] alien committed 
a ‘particularly serious crime’ because, in such a case, the alien 
is considered a ‘danger to the community of the United 
States.’”  Flores v. Att’y Gen., 856 F.3d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 
2017) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii)).   
 
Grijalva Martinez asserts that he is not subject to the 
particularly serious crime bar because only aggravated felonies 
can be particularly serious crimes and he was not convicted of 
an aggravated felony.  Grijalva Martinez is wrong for three 
reasons.  First, as just explained, Grijalva Martinez was indeed 
 
10 We have jurisdiction to review Grijalva Martinez’s 
withholding-of-removal claim because it raises a question of 
“[w]hether an IJ applied the correct legal standard.”  Luziga v. 
Att’y Gen., 937 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2019) (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see 
also § 1252(a)(2)(D); Nkomo v. Att’y Gen., 930 F.3d 129, 135 
(3d Cir. 2019).  We review the agency’s classifications of 
particularly serious crimes “de novo, subject to Chevron 
principles of deference.”  Denis v. Att’y Gen. 633 F.3d 201, 
205-06 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Luziga v. Att’y Gen., 937 F.3d 
244, 251 (3d Cir. 2019). 
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convicted of an aggravated felony, and he is therefore 
statutorily precluded from applying for withholding of 
removal.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B).  Second, even if 
Grijalva Martinez had not been convicted of an aggravated 
felony, offenses that are not aggravated felonies can be 
particularly serious crimes.  See Bastardo-Vale v. Att’y Gen., 
934 F.3d 255, 266-67 (3d Cir. 2019) (en banc) (holding that 
“both aggravated felonies and other offenses can be 
particularly serious crimes,” given that “aggravated felonies 
[are only one] subset of particularly serious crimes”).  Third, 
even if Grijalva Martinez’s offense does not qualify as an 
aggravated felony, the IJ did not err in concluding that Grijalva 
Martinez was convicted of a particularly serious crime.   
 
An IJ has “broad discretion” to determine whether a 
prior conviction is a particularly serious crime, Nkomo v. Att’y 
Gen., 930 F.3d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 2019), through a “case-by-
case adjudication,” Denis v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 214 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Bastardo-Vale, 934 F.3d at 262.  In making this 
determination, the IJ may consider “such factors as [1] the 
nature of the conviction, [2] the circumstances and underlying 
facts of the conviction, [3] the type of sentence imposed, and, 
most importantly, [4] whether the type and circumstances of 
the crime indicate that the alien will be a danger to the 
community.”  Luziga v. Att’y Gen., 937 F.3d 244, 252 (3d Cir. 
2019) (alterations in original) (quoting Matter of Frentescu, 18 
I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (B.I.A. 1982)).   
 
Grijalva Martinez was convicted of criminal sexual 
contact for groping the “buttocks and vaginal area” of a teenage 
girl at the beach, after exposing himself to her and two other 
girls of similar ages.  AR 299-300.  The IJ “properly considered 
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the nature of [these] acts,” Denis, 633 F.3d at 217, finding that 
Grijalva Martinez had committed “numerous offenses that 
included public lewdness for having exposed himself and 
sexually inappropriate physical contact with the victims,” AR 
95.  Despite Grijalva Martinez’s protestations of his innocence, 
we agree with the IJ that there was “overwhelming evidence,” 
AR 95, that Grijalva Martinez repeatedly and deliberately 
engaged in these acts.  The seriousness of Grijalva Martinez’s 
conduct is also reflected in his sentence.  The sentencing court 
itself noted the harm that Grijalva Martinez inflicted on the 
victim and his risk of recidivism.  As a result, Grijalva 
Martinez was sentenced to several months’ imprisonment, 
ordered to serve a lifetime term of parole, and directed to 
register as a sex offender.  Given these facts, the IJ’s finding 
was “a permissible reading and application of the phrase 
[‘particularly serious crime’],” and “we will not disturb [the 
IJ’s] determination” that Grijalva Martinez was convicted of a 




The IJ and BIA also did not err in denying Grijalva 
Martinez CAT relief.  Although Grijalva Martinez encountered 
 
11 Because the jurisdictional limitations in 
§ 1252(a)(2)(C)-(d) “do not preclude judicial review of a 
noncitizen’s factual challenges to a CAT order,” we have 
jurisdiction to review Grijalva Martinez’s CAT claim.  
Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1694 (2020).  Because the 
BIA here adopted the IJ’s reasons concerning the denial of 
CAT relief, “we review both the BIA and IJ decisions.”  Oliva-
Ramos v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 259, 270 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  “The standard 
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several episodes of random violence in Guatemala, such as an 
armed robbery and an attempted vehicular manslaughter, he 
presented no evidence showing a “connection or common 
motive” behind the crimes that he witnessed, AR 103, and no 
evidence that the crimes occurred with the acquiescence of 
government officials apart from country condition reports.  
Moreover, there is substantial evidence to support the IJ’s 
conclusion that the country condition reports did not establish 
any likelihood that Grijalva Martinez himself would be 
tortured there.  See Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 188 
(3d Cir. 2003) (holding that country condition reports “alone 
[were] insufficient to demonstrate that it is more likely than not 
that a particular civilian, in this case [the petitioner], will be 
tortured” if returned to his home country).  Thus, the BIA and 
IJ did not err in finding Grijalva Martinez ineligible for CAT 




For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for 
review.     
 
of review [for factual challenges to CAT determinations] is the 
substantial-evidence standard:  [t]he agency’s ‘findings of fact 
are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be 
compelled to conclude to the contrary.’”  Nasrallah, 140 S. Ct. 
at 1692 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). 
